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May, 2010

  1. May 20, 2010 by Matt Mireles

    Here's an example of SpeakerText in action. The that's great thing about it. Look at what we're doing…

    I sat down with Brightcove CEO Jeremy Allaire at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland last week to talk about his business.

    Brightcove isn’t the sexiest startup out there. They’re a video platform – giving websites the tools they need to host and stream video, for a fee ranging from $100/month to “six figures per year” for the largest customers. For the most part users never see the Brightcove brand. And Allaire is just fine with that. He just wants happy customers.

    ARRINGTON: What do they get for the $99?

    ALLAIRE: They get basically the full tool set that, you know, maybe three years ago, people would have spent $30,000 on, so it’s – we’re really trying to, you know, in some ways, commoditize the market. 

    The company launched in 2005, has raised just over $90 million in venture capital, and is approaching profitability, he says. Allaire says he wants to build a public company, and is happy being based in Boston.

    Brightcove competes with newer upstarts like Ooyala, although Allaire says Brightcove remains the strongest company in its space. Another competitor, Maven Networks, was acquired by Yahoo in 2008 for around $160 million. The product was unceremoniously shut down by Yahoo a year later. Allaire says they picked up most of Maven’s customers.

    You can see the full interview above. And don’t miss the outtake at the end of the video where Allaire gives some free tech support to a customer. Time Inc. reporter Barbara Kiviat was having some issues uploading a video.

    ghoi


  2. Naval on GigaOM TV

    May 14, 2010 by Matt Mireles


  3. Nurturing the Entrepreneur DNA

    May 13, 2010 by Matt Mireles

    I've been thinking a lot lately about how we improve some of the structural issues with NYC as an entrepreneurial center/startup hub. It got me thinking of the debate around Nature vs Nurture regarding entrepreneurship. Here's some thoughts…


    Slide1
    Some people are born entrepreneurs.
    They don't like rules. They don't like constraints. And they are able to combine that disdain for the status quo with a productive creativity. But it's not a binary either/or kind of thing. It's a trait that a lot of people have on some level, and the strength of its expression exists on a spectrum. I'll call this the Entrepreneurial trait "E"

    Being an entrepreneur is not the same as starting a company. Business entrepreneurs are only one kind of entrepreneur, and sometimes starting a business (under certain conditions) doesn't require you to be very entrepreneurial. The more the environment discourages starting companies, the more entrepreneurial you have to be to start a company. Conversely, the more the environment encourages starting companies, the less entrepreneurial you have to be to start a company. I'll call this the Business Propensity co-efficient "b"

    Propensity to Start a Company = E*b

    My Dad's Story
    My father has entrepreneur DNA in spades. And if not inborn, then the mould was caste at an early age. He was born in a one-room adobe house in the New Mexico desert in 1929. His father had died a few months before, and his mother, age 19, a kind and caring woman, possessed a high school diploma and not much else. From day one, as is custom in latin households for the eldest male, he assumed the mantle of "man of the house." 

    When he was 6, my father was displaced as man of the house by a coal miner named Cunningham, who married my grandma. Cunningham would get drunk and beat her. In the winter of 1935, my father, my grandma and his newborn sister Dorothy escaped. My pa' was once again man of the house. 

    When he was 12, he started working in a logging camp. When he was 14, despite being an awkward, skinny twerp, he started laying railroad tracks. The railroad foreman laughed at him when he showed up, told him he wouldn't last a day. His hands bled. He lasted.   

    When he was 16, he announced to my grandma that he was moving to Los Angeles, that their little town in the desert was too small for him, that he needed to escape "the chains" that had been placed on his brain, that he had ambition that could not be met in Tularosa, New Mexico. And so they packed up and left. Their new home: a federal housing project in East LA. 

    One thing you gotta understand about my dad (I'll get back to how this fits into the big picture in a sec) is that back in the day, he was angry. He was fatherless and brown and poor in a world where all the rich people were white––and something inside of him was deeply pissed off. This anger drove him, it compelled him to break the chains, to overcome the pain, to bleed, to do whatever the fuck it took to get what he wanted. 

    This was a time when you could still call someone a "dirty Mexican" in polite company––back before the days of affirmative action and "diversity initiatives." What he got, he got because he was an entrepreneur. There were no businessmen in my family. My great grandpa had been a cowboy, literally. My grandma was a waitress. A few years after he passed the 20 year mark and––much to his surprise––was still alive, he decided to go to college. First East LA Community College. Then UCLA. Then UCLA grad school. And ultimately, a PhD and a professorship, which he used to start one of the first Chicano Studies departments in the country at East LA College and launch a bunch of other innovative initiatives. To finance this all, he used the GI Bill and worked as a construction worker, laying pipe in the streets. 

    I tell this story of my father again because I think it's instructive. He clearly had the entrepreneurial DNA that Mark Suster described: Tenacity, Street Smarts, Ability to Pivot, Resiliency, Inspiration, Perspiration, Willingness to Accept Risk, Attention to Detail, Competitiveness, Decisiveness and Integrity. And yet he never started a company

    Me thinks: Starting a company involves more than having entrepreneurial DNA. Education and culture have a HUGE role in the process. 

    Social Networks & Education
    Our educational system does not teach people how to start businesses or even the bare basics of how a business works. If you're starting out like my father did, the process of how you figure out the basics of business is opaque and horribly confusing, especially in a pre-Google world. 

    The internet is leveling the playing field to some extent, especially in the startup world with the proliferation of high quality blogs that quite literally teach you the ropes (think Mark Suster, Brad Feld, Chris Dixon, Fred Wilson's MBA Mondays, Venture Hacks, etc). But the discovery problem hasn't been entirely solved yet. And nothing beats having a mentor or network of mentors who can answer questions and offer guidance, both intellectual (hello Quora!) and emotional. 

    A lot of it is simply having role models––as Jordan Cooper put it recently in a comment

    You need founders who look and smell like college students to come in and say, "look, I am not smarter than you. I was not better prepared than you. If I can do this…and…I AM DOING THIS…than you probably can too…

    I don't think that student's are missing the "value prop" of starting a company, I think they just perceive themselves as somehow unprepared or unequal to the Mark Zuckerberg's of the world. in NY, students need to see hipsters in jeans and t-shirts building companies they know and respect, and then they need to calibrate themselves intellectually with those hipsters and realize there is not a whole lot of difference between the two groups.

    Networks matter because the more people you see who look and think just like you starting companies, the less opaque and daunting the process becomes. Social networks serve as a source of informal education. (Social networks as in literally the people you know, not Facebook the platform.) And for folks who don't know a lot of founders, formal entrepreneurial business education can create real value and change people's lives. 

    This was definitely true for me: I didn't know shit about business until I went to Stanford for a summer and attended a mini-MBA type training program they offer at the Business School. Not only did it teach me basic business principals, but also it helped me build a network. There I met Joe Kennedy, the CEO of Pandora. He has been helping me out and advising me ever since. 

    Social Class & Economic Risk
    I was drinking beer last night with some Columbia students. One of them was from Miles City, Montana. His mother worked as a waitress at diner, his father a manager at an auto-parts store. He had joined the Marines when he was 18, served two tours in Iraq as a Combat Engineer, and two weeks after being discharged, started Columbia. He had just finished his freshman year.

    "What do you want to do when you're done?" I asked. 

    "I dunno, maybe work for the CIA or something," he said. "Maybe law school. I dunno."

    "Ever thought of starting a company?" I inquired.

    He shook his head: "No."

    When you come from the lower middle class and below, your idea of what constitutes attainable social status and overall life possibilities is very different than what your average Choate grad sees in his/her future. No one they knew growing up was a corporate exec. None of their friends' dads were entrepreneurs of the Silicon Valley (or often even the non-drug dealing) variety. Because there's such an information deficeit around entrepreneurship, lower middle class strivers don't even see it as an option, and instead they gravitate toward the known, well-established means of upward mobility: Grad school! Big, brand name companies! Not little fucking startups involving shit pay and a life of teetering on the economic precipice. 

    Furthermore, people who come from poor or less-than-wealthy families tend to have a lot of student debt. It raises their minimum livable monthly income, and that makes doing a startup much, much harder. Plus, these peeps tend not to have the mom & dad cushion to fall back on––and more likely, they're sending cash home to their families. So not only do they perceive it, but they actually are subject to greater economic risk. 

    No discussion of creating an entrepreneurial culture is complete without taking this socio-economic reality into account––which is doubly important given that so many entrepreneurs and investors know so little of it. 

    Our current system is really good at getting––to paraphase John Doerr––white, upper middle class geeks to start companies. But that is an inefficient use of our societal talent and aggregate entrepreneurial DNA. Does anyone really think there's something inherent in the white, upper middle class geek population that makes them pre-disposed to starting companies? Or is it that they have the right combo of social networks, education, economic situation and informal education to take the leap? 

    Venture Capital returns are down. We need a fatter pipe. We need more entrepreneurs starting companies. And it's not a matter of "making entrepreneurs" out of scratch. Rather, we need to actualize the latent entrepreneurial DNA and talent that exists in our society but goes unrealized because that silly Business Propensity co-efficient. 

    There are thousands upon thousands of people out there like my father: Entrepreneurs at heart, but uneducated in and disconnected from the fabric and inner workings of capitalism. Because we don't know who they are, we need to provide business training "nurture" in a more formal, evenly distributed and systematized way to all of society. It's the only way that we'll get more of this latent entrepreneurial DNA to actually go out and start companies.


  4. Entrepreneur and Investor Alignment

    May 12, 2010 by Matt Mireles

    2x2

    In the matrix, the green represents good alignment, the yellow represents ok but keep watch, and the red represents where I see some of the larger disagreements. The matrix explains the basic situation for all 4 combinations so I’ll just focus on the yellow and red areas as the green areas are fairly self-explanatory and straightforward.

    Yellow – Smaller VC fund, Smaller exit need, Entrepreneur looking for large personal win $25-50M. While there is some misalignment here, this is actually a less common situation and often doesn’t become an issue in practice. The reasons are that many entrepreneurs looking for big exits often have already had one hit and have plenty of personal funds. They often use their own money to self-fund the business initially and often don’t need a small amount of outside money but go straight for a much larger Series A from a larger VC. In addition, even for smaller funds who do invest early with these entrepreneurs, if the company is doing very well, those investors are happy to bring in larger VC syndicate partners who have deeper pockets and can fund to a much larger exit. The smaller VC will get a good bump in valuation and is happy to leverage their investment to go for the big exit that the entrepreneur and new VC seek.

    Red – Larger VC fund, Larger exit need, Entrepreneur looking for moderate personal win $5-10M. This is where I see the most misalignment, conflicts between VC and entrepreneur, and the primary focus of this post. The conflict occurs in many different situations – whether a company is doing well or not. When companies are doing well, they often have opportunities to exit earlier from incoming acquisition offers. For an entrepreneur who has an opportunity to exit a company at $50M and thereby allowing the entrepreneur to personally make more than $5-10M, this often isn’t big enough to interest the VC who can block the exit and push the company to go for higher exit size (but often a much higher risk to the company). Other areas that this occurs is when determining whether to grow/expand quickly vs getting to profitability. For an entrepreneur to reach his objective, slower growth but getting to profitabilty faster can be the best option, but for the VC, growth over profitability is often the objective thereby require more spend and often leading to more financing rounds diluting the entrepreneur….and these disagreements occur when the company is doing well so generally everyone is happier and want to work together. The misalignment get much more contentious when the company is not doing as well.

    Given the varied perspectives of different VCs and entrepreneurs, founders should make sure they understand this dynamic (as the VC will definitely be experienced and understand this well).

    via www.socaltech.com


  5. The City of Founders Without Hackers

    May 10, 2010 by Matt Mireles

    Every startup in NYC is looking for developers. Literally: Every. Single. One.

    And this is a problem.

    New York City has a shortage of entrepreneurially minded technical talent. It’s not that there’s not enough engineers. Hardly. Columbia, NYU and the rest of the eastern seaboard spits out engineers in spades each year. But somehow those aren’t funneled into, aware of or interested in the NYC startups, at least at the early stage. Local engineers, it seems, want to be employees, not co-founders.

    To wit, my friend Geoff Lewis, Founder/CEO of NYC-based TopGuest, glanced on the topic in a recent post he wrote for the Business Insider:

    Today, it is more possible than ever before for one person to effectively lead both building and selling during a consumer internet startup’s early growth phase. I’m seeing it done first hand by some of my single-founder friends, each of whom I believe will be wildly successful…In lieu of co-founders, these folks are instead assembling strong teams of employees, often in “co-founder-like” roles, after having established their companies.

    via www.businessinsider.com (Emphasis Added)

    Chris Dixon and a few other VCs in Twitter-land communicated a strong disapproval of this single-founder concept.

    But if you look at seed-stage startups in NYC, I’d say 85% of them follow this pattern: Non-technical founder in search of a technical co-founder…or, absent that, a code monkey, technologist, intern, whatever––someone who can code, goddamnit!

    I don’t know of any official statistics that track this, but as someone on the ground, it seems like startup formation is increasing at an exponential rate while the amount engineering talent is static or facing merely linear growth. However the specifics pan out, demand vastly exceeds supply, and the gap seems to be growing, not shrinking.


    Unless we eliminate the chokepoint around technical talent, the NYC startup boom is going to turn into another bubble
    . And founders in my position will, if they’re clear-eyed and ruthless, realize that being here is a source of location risk.

    (To be clear, this is not just a case of sour grapes. I did find recruiting engineers in NYC for SpeakerText to be a pain, but ultimately found success by looking elsewhere. We recently brought on board a new CTO, which gives us at a 3: 1 ratio of technical to non-technical founders.  But he came to us by way of friends in Palo Alto who followed my blog).

    There are two distinct but synchronous trends driving the NYC startup explosion:

    • Secular contraction in traditional media <—Creates Founders
    • Cyclical contraction in financial services <—Frees up Hackers

    And this is all happening in a macro-context of high unemployment and general recession drives even the unwitting towards entrepreneurship.

    Medium-term, expect to see an even bigger technical talent crunch when Wall Street and the financial services industry rebound––unless you think that Wall Street is undergoing a secular (rather than cyclical) contraction. But that’s another debate for another time.

    But right here, right now, the problems break down as follows…

    Segregated Social Networks
    Startups in NYC tend to be run by first-time founders. The problem is that these first-timers (like me) are typically non-technologists coming from non-technical industries (like advertising or media). And they don’t actually know many engineers.

    As it turns out, it’s relatively easy for non-technical founders to network their way to venture capitalist investors. (Previously, I had written that NYC lacked early-stage risk capital, which it definitely does relative to SV, but the gap is shrinking rapidly and it turns out you can get around this problem by simply hopping on a plane.)

    On one hand you have what is becoming a relatively tight network of business-minded founders & investors; on the other you have a loose federation of hackers who seem to be not only disconnected from the business people in the community but also weakly networked amongst themselves. This is a HUGE problem.

    When M2 joined SpeakerText, we didn’t just get access to his personal talent––we got access to his entire network at CMU. Last Monday, I told him we needed a new front-end developer––by Tuesday night we had a line on two strong candidates. Now, my experience is admittedly limited, but I haven’t met a lot of engineers in NYC who have networks like that that they can call on. And to the point, all of my friends who were looking for technical co-founders two months ago are still looking today.

    Cash vs Equity Culture
    As a startup ecosystem matures, market participants start to understand the value of equity. Essentially, after people have seen a few big exits, stock options start to seem valuable and take hold of the popular imagination. When people see their once-upon-a-time geeky-poor friends get rich seemingly overnight, the greed kicks in. This is a big part of what makes any startup ecosystem tick (also why Wall Street is so alluring).

    The problem is, most people in NYC don’t understand the value of stock options. Payment in cash is the norm, both in NYC and everywhere else EXCEPT for startup land. Post-Series A financing, startups can typically afford to pay market rate for engineers. But pre-Series A, especially at the earliest formation stage, there’s little or no money whatsoever.

    To get to that point where you can raise money, you need risk-seeking technologists who want to build cool shit. And when Wall Street guarantees six-figure paychecks on day one, the opportunity cost of doing a startup becomes very, very high.

    Not only does Wall Street train engineers to value cash over equity, it’s that once you’ve worked at Goldman or a hedge fund for 2-5 years, you develop an expensive lifestyle that requires that same kind of constant cash-flow to maintain. The ole’ Golden Handcuffs, as they’re called. The problem is that Startups create (hopefully) discontinuous wealth––a long period of relative poverty followed by either total bankruptcy or a potential life-altering exit.

    This needs to change. Junior engineers need to learn the value of equity if NYC is to be a sustainable over the long term. Sadly, competition for talent with Wall Street is a zero-sum game. The bigger Wall Street is, the greater the opportunity cost of doing a startup in NYC. And the smaller Wall Street is, the lower the opportunity cost of starting a company. No way around it.

    True story: On my last trip to Palo Alto, I had beers with a very talented engineer who was being recruited by a very hot startup. Shit, I thought, how could anyone turn that down. But this engineer had his doubts. His reasoning: this startup had already raised a Series A at a high valuation. The company had to be really huge if his equity stake was ever going to amount to anything, and even then it was unlikely he’d get the kind of wealth that a founder would receive in even a moderate-sized exit. He turned them down.

    I have never run across this kind of sophisticated thinking about startups in NYC or anywhere else outside of the Valley. It requires people to have been through the startup cycle multiple times. NYC simply isn’t there yet––nor are most places.

    The Fundamental Problem: Academia
    Cultural mores and social networks can change. And if NYC creates some breakout startups that make it big, those things will change. They are the problems of an immature, growing scene. Nothing a big exit or two won’t solve.

    The real problem goes deeper: The connection between academia and NYC startups is very, very weak. The top universities send a mere trickle of talent into local startups, and then only by accident. Whereas Stanford pipes students into Silicon Valley startups at industrial scale and efficiency, Columbia (my alma mater) and NYU barely realizes the scene exists. And no one save for a few heroic folks inside the universities themselves (more on them in a later post) seems to take the problem seriously.

    Unless local universities start piping engineering grads into the startup ecosystem in some sort of organized fashion, NYC will never be more than a bit player in the global startup landscape. Her destiny will be to forever rise and fall in size and import opposite the cyclical expansion and contraction of Wall Street.

    The scene is out of balance. Founders are starting companies without hackers. Technology companies exist without technologists. It’s fucking crazy.

    Tomorrow: All the good shit happening in NYC that involves people trying to address these problems.


  6. Patent Absurdity

    May 9, 2010 by Matt Mireles

    Video: Patent Absurdity – Dokumentarfilm (28:54)

    Hat tip to Fred Wilson


  7. Why Do Harvard Kids Head to Wall Street?

    May 6, 2010 by Matt Mireles

    Why Do Harvard Kids Head to Wall Street?

    By James Kwak

    That’s the title of a post a couple weeks ago by Ezra Klein, in which he interviewed a friend of his who went to Wall Street after Harvard. Having seen this phenomenon from a couple of different angles, I’d say the interview is right on. This is how Klein summarizes the central theme:

    “The impression of the Ivy-to-Wall Street pipeline is that it’s all about the money. You’re saying that it’s actually more that Wall Street has constructed a very intelligent recruiting program that speaks to the anxieties of the students and makes them an offer that there’s almost no reason to refuse.”

    When I graduated from college, I had no interest in investment banking or its close cousin, management consulting. But I went to McKinsey for reasons that were only slightly different than those of the typical Ivy League undergrad; after getting a Ph.D. in history, I discovered that I was unlikely to get a good academic job and was pretty much unqualified for anything else, and McKinsey was one of the few places that would hire me into a “good” job with no discernible qualifications (other than academic pedigree). Now that I’m at Yale Law School, where maybe 15% of students (my wild guess) come in wanting to be corporate lawyers but 75% end up at corporate law firms (first job after law school, not counting clerkships), I’m seeing it again.

    The typical Harvard undergraduate is someone who: (a) is very good at school; (b) has been very successful by conventional standards for his entire life; (c) has little or no experience of the “real world” outside of school or school-like settings; (d) feels either the ambition or the duty to have a positive impact on the world (not well defined); and (e) is driven more by fear of not being a success than by a concrete desire to do anything in particular. (Yes, I know this is a stereotype; that’s why I said “typical.”) Their (our) decisions are motivated by two main decision rules: (1) close down as few options as possible; and (2) only do things that increase the possibility of future overachievement. Money is far down the list; at this point in their lives, if you asked them, many of these people would probably say that they only need to be middle or upper-middle class, and assume that they will be.

    The recruiting processes of Wall Street firms (and consulting firms, and corporate law firms) exploit these (faulty) decision rules perfectly. The primary selling point of Goldman Sachs or McKinsey is that it leaves open the possibility of future greatness. The main pitch is, “Do this for two years, and afterward you can do anything (like be treasury secretary).” The idea is that you will get some kind of generic business training that equips you to do anything (this in a society that assumes the private sector can do no wrong and the public sector can do no right), and that you will get the resume credentials and connections you need to go on and do whatever you want. And to some extent it’s true, because these names look good on your resume, and very few potential future employers will wonder why you decided to go there. (Whether the training is good for much other than being a banker or a consultant is another question.)

    The second selling point is that they make it easy. Yes, there is competition for jobs at these firms. But the process is easy. They come to campus and hold receptions with open bars. They tell you when and how to apply. They provide interview coaching. They have nice people who went to your school

    via baselinescenario.com

    We need to fix this problem. Big time.


  8. Fighting Information Asymmetry (i.e. Why I Love Venture Hacks)

    May 5, 2010 by Matt Mireles

    We were in the trenches together.  We fought for every customer together.  Hell – we fought against the VC’s together!

     -Mark Suster, Both Sides of the Table.  

    As a first-time founder, there's so much you don't know and don't understand when you step into the world of venture capital. Investor signaling. LP relationships. Fund size. Fund vintage. Angels vs. Seed funds vs VCs. It's a game we play with a lot less information than the guys on the other side of the table. 

    Yes, it is a game. And the VCs collude

    Assertion #1: The market is not rational. Stop pretending it is.

    Hot Potato can spend a year looking for money then the FourSquare deal pops and they suddenly get showered with money and their A round is oversubscribed at $1.4mil. Nothing fundamental changed, just the market for money. 

    C'est la vie. 

    This is why entrepreneurs need to collude! Market information allows you to negotiate pricing and apply normative leverage. And the more information you share with other founders, the more information you get in return, and the more information you get, the better you can play the game. 

    And, umm, guys, it really is us against them. Not forever. Not after we've got their money in the bank. But up until the point that they write a check, our interests are at odds. 

    "But Matt, aren't investors instrumental in building great companies? VCs are here to help…"

    All very true, all very correct––after they cut us a check. What I'm talking about is the before.

    Assertion #2: It is in the Founders' interest to get the most money at the lowest price in the shortest time

    If you come to me today and say "Hi Matt, I'll give you $10mil at an $80mil pre-money valuation," I will either: a) say yes, or b) if the terms are bad (onerous liquidation preferences), use it to raise slightly less money at a slightly lower valuation with better terms (preferably no liquidation preference). What would SpeakerText do with $10mil? I have no fucking idea. Probably hire someone to figure out what we'll do with $10mil. Or have a money fight. 

    But we'd take the money because it gives us time to build, pivot, learn and grow––without the distraction of having to raise more money. It wouldn't be based on some well thought out use of proceeds or needs. Cuz really, our burn rate is just super, super low. We are scrappy motherfuckers who can and have gotten by on a tiny amount of money. But once we hit product-market fit, we want to be able to hit the accelerator without the distraction of having to pause and raise more $$$.

    Raising money is a huge, unproductive distraction. You should seek to shorten the time it takes as much as possible. 

    Assertion #3: It is in the VCs' interest to acquire the most ownership of a company at the lowest price with the least risk.

    (And yes, I am clumping individual angels, seed funds and VC firms together in one boat.)

    This means that it is in their interest to acquire shares in your (successful) company at the lowest price possible. Buy low, sell high––that kind of thing. This should be obvious. 

    Just one caveat: they don't want the entrepreneur to own so little of the company that they stop working. And the game is iterated, so they have an incentive to not be known as pricks who screw entrepreneurs. 

    Assertion #4: Sharing market information improves market outcomes for all entrepreneurs.  

    The more entrepreneurs collude, the bigger the incentive that VCs have to play nice and offer good terms. Take The Funded. How many VCs have changed their behavior based on public reviews they'd gotten on the site? Or gone out of business? I don't know for sure, but I'd bet money that the number is >1. 

    When David Lifson of Postling told me the dirty details of their last investment round, it gave me data with which to think about my own situation. And more importantly, it inspired me to share more details of my own misadventures with other entrepreneurs––who in turn shared info with me. And we all learned. That's the point. 

    What's "market" ? No one really knows:

    The only way to know what’s market is to research a broad enough base of deals both current deals and over some reasonable past period, in a relevant market (geographical, stage (series A or follow on) and a relevant industry (biotech, renewable, etc.) to be able to draw some meaningful conclusion.

    Since most people don't have access to this kind of data, the real answer is an individual's perspective of "market" is really just the mean of any random number of data points. Wanna play the game better? Get more data. Use it as normative leverage. And to get, you gotta first give.

    Enter Venture Hacks.

    I love Venture Hacks because they peel back the facade and lovey-dovey bullshit and explain the messy internal workings of startups and the venture capital business in a way that few peeps do. Take this AWESOME interview with Mark Suster, Chris Dixon and Naval Ravikant as an example : VC signaling in seed rounds

    Question: How do seed investors actually make decisions? Answer: The market is not rational. In most situations, investors tend to follow social cues more than they analyze market or business fundamentals. It ain't pretty, but it's life.

    And for entrepreneurs raising money, understanding this fucked up psychology is absolutely crucial. It's a game. We play it as novices. They do not. 

    So Founders, please remember who the opposition is: It's not other startups. It's them. Against us. Until they give us money––at which point it becomes them AND us against the competition, or Google, or Microsoft, or DST. (I know this sounds a bit crazy and extreme, but you should REALLY listen to the Venture Hacks interview. If you've never heard about how on occasion bad VCs can screw companies, you'll come away from this interview feeling scared shitless. I know I did.)

    Some day some of us will be on the other side of the table, but until then, for godsakes, share what you know. We need it. It benefits us all.

    UPDATE: My man David Lifson sent me this tweet…

    Screen shot 2010-05-06 at 7.37.28 PMI think he makes a great point. The guys in this interview (Mark Suster, Chris Dixon and Naval Ravikant) are a case in point. The thing that scares me is how they were throwing around or alluding to some VERY REPUTABLE names in VC during the interview as folks doing bad shit that screws entrepreneurs/startups. 

    The question is: How do you tell the good ones from the bad? This is where information sharing amongst founders and thinking of ourselves as a class becomes so important. 


  9. Mark Pincus on VC–Entrepreneur Alignment

    May 1, 2010 by Matt Mireles

    Zynga founder and CEO Mark Pincus put it very well to me when he said, “I tell entrepreneurs:  don't be a victim. It doesn't matter whether you like the venture capitalists or don’t like them, really.  Structurally, they have areas of conflict and areas of overlap with you.  Depending on the way things go, there's a high likelihood that you're going to run into conflict with them at some point, whether they're your friends or not. And what defines great companies and what defines great venture capitalists and great entrepreneurs is not whether or not you run into those conflicts, but it's how you navigate around them.”  The key is to de-personalize this and simply understand what is the job of a venture capitalist and what are their levers.

    via onstartups.com